We analyze bargaining situations where the agents' payoffs from disagreement depend on who among them breaks down the negotiations. We model such problems as a superset of the standard domain of Nash (1950). We first show that this domain extension creates a very large number of new rules. Particularly, decomposable rules (which are extensions of rules from the Nash domain) constitute a nowhere dense subset of all possible rules. We next enquire if the counterparts of some standard results on the Nash (1950) domain continue to hold for decomposable rules on our extended domain. We first show that an extension of the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining rule uniquely satisfies the Kalai-Smorodinsky (1975) properties. This uniqueness result, however, turns out to be an exception. We characterize the uncountably large classes of decomposable rules that survive the Nash (1950), Kalai (1977), and Thomson (1981) properties. We also show that extensions to our domain of a standard independence property (by Peters, 1986) imply decomposability. Finally, we analyze the process through which "good" properties of rules on the Nash domain extend to ours.
Introduction
A typical bargaining problem, as modeled by Nash (1950) and the vast literature that follows, is made up of two elements. The first is a set of alternative agreements on which the agents negotiate. The second element is an alternative realized in case of disagreement.
This "disagreement outcome" does not however contain detailed information about the nature of disagreement. Particularly, it is assumed in the existing literature that the realized disagreement alternative is independent of who among the agents disagree(s).
In real life examples of bargaining, however, the identity of the agent who terminates the negotiations turns out to have a significant effect on the agents' "disagreement payoffs". The reunion negotiations between the northern and the southern parts of Cyprus that took place at the beginning of 2004 constitute a good example. Due to a very strong support from the international community towards the island's reunion, neither party preferred to be the one to disagree. Also, each preferred the other's disagreement to some agreements which they in turn preferred to leaving the negotiation table themselves. 1 Wage negotiations between firms and labor unions constitute another example to the dependence of the disagreement payoffs on the identity of the disagreer. There, the disagreement action of the union, a strike, and that of the firm, a lockout, can be significantly different in terms of their payoff implications. 2 Finally, note that the bargaining framework is frequently used in economic models of family (see e.g. Becker (1981) , Manser and Brown (1980) , Sen (1983) and the following literature):
the married couple bargains on alternative joint-decisions and divorce is their disagreement alternative. In the current models, payoffs from divorce do not depend on who in the couple leaves the marriage. However, it seems to us that this is hardly the case in reality. 1 There is a vast number of articles that discuss the issue. For example, see the Economist articles dated and makes an (unexpected) "preemptive strike" against the other.
Note that, neither of these examples can be fully represented in the confines of Nash's (1950) standard model. We therefore extend this model to a nonanonymous-disagreement model of bargaining by allowing the agents' payoffs from disagreement to depend on who among them disagrees. For this, we replace the disagreement payoff vector in the Nash (1950) model with a disagreement payoff matrix. The i th row of this matrix is the payoff vector that results from agent i terminating the negotiations. The standard (anonymousdisagreement) domain of Nash (1950) is a "measure-zero" subset of ours where all rows of the disagreement matrix are identical. 3 Our contribution to the literature is two-fold. First, we introduce a model that enables us to focus on an important aspect of most real-life negotiations. For example, our ability to distinguish between an agent's payoff from his own disagreement and his payoffs from others' disagreements brings out an alternative notion of individual rationality: externality lower bound is based on the idea that sometimes a rational agent will prolong the negotiations because he prefers the opponent's disagreement to the existing proposals even though he prefers some of these proposals to leaving the table himself.
Our domain extension significantly increases the amount of admissible rules. Every rule on the Nash domain has counterparts on our domain. (We call such rules decomposable since they are a composition of a rule from the Nash domain and a function that transforms disagreement matrices to disagreement vectors). But our domain also offers an abundance of rules that are nondecomposable (that is, they are not counterparts of rules from the Nash domain). In Subsection 3.1, we show that the class of decomposable rules is a nowhere dense subset of all bargaining rules. That is, the interior of the class of nondecomposable rules is sufficient to approximate any rule (i.e. it is dense).
The class of decomposable rules, however, contains the (uncountably many) extensions of each rule that has been analyzed in the literature until now. The analysis of this class 3 One restriction of our model is that it does not specify the outcome of a coalition of agents jointly terminating the negotiations. Modeling coordinated disagreement by a coalition would bring in questions about the bargaining process in that coalition and move us further towards a non-transferable utility game analysis. In this paper, we choose to remain in the bargaining framework and only consider individual deviations.
is thus crucial in understanding the links between the findings of the existing literature and our model. Our second contribution is on this front.
In Subsection 3.1, we show that a rule is decomposable if it satisfies an extension to our domain of a standard independence property by Peters (1986) . The original property, called independence of non-individually rational alternatives, requires the solution to depend only on the set of individually rational alternatives and, for individually rational rules, is considerably weaker than the controversial "contraction independence" property of Nash The above result presents one of possibly many cases in which a basic requirement on the bargaining rule necessitates it to be decomposable. (That is, while the set of decomposable rules is "small", it contains many "desirable" rules.) This motivates us to further study implications of decomposability. To this end, we enquire if the counterparts of some standard results on the Nash domain continue to hold for decomposable rules on our extended domain.
We first show (in Subsection 3.2) that an extension of the Kalai-Smorodinsky rule uniquely satisfies the Kalai-Smorodinsky (1975) properties. This uniqueness result, however, turns out to be an exception. In subsections 3.3 and 3.4, we show that an infinite number of decomposable rules survive the Nash (1950), Kalai (1977) , and Thomson (1981) properties even though, on problems with anonymous disagreement each of these results characterizes a single rule. Furthermore, we characterize the exact classes of decomposable rules that satisfies these properties.
Finally, in Subsection 3.5, we analyze the relationship between "good" properties of a decomposable rule and that of its components. We show that, if a decomposable rule is "sufficiently sensitive" to the disagreement payoffs, its scale invariance and symmetry properties carry on to its aggregator function. 4 In our domain, even for individually rational rules, independence of non-individually rational alternatives and contraction independence are logically independent. For example, the individually rational extension of the Kalai-Smorodinsky (1975) rule (κ I ) satisfies the first property and violates the second and the extension of the Nash (1950) rule that respects the externality lower bound (ν E ) satisfies the second property and violates the first. (For formal definitions of these rules, please see Subsection 3.1).
Related literature.
In a companion paper (Kıbrıs and Tapkı (2006)), we focus on the implications of monotonicity properties on our domain. We first show that a strong monotonicity property (Kalai, 1977) , together with other basic properties (namely, weak Pareto optimality and a continuity property), characterizes a class of monotone path rules (introduced by Thomson and Myerson (1980) and further discussed by Peters and Tijs (1984) ; also see Thomson [30] for an extensive discussion). We observe that most monotone path rules are nondecomposable. We also characterize a subclass of monotone path rules that additionally satisfy scale invariance. Interestingly, no such rules exist on the Nash domain (since there, the above properties are not compatible). We then show that a weaker monotonicity property called restricted monotonicity (Roth, 1979) , together with some other properties (namely, weak
Pareto optimality, scale invariance, symmetry, and a limited sensitivity property introduced by Gupta and Livne (1988) ), characterizes a version of the Kalai-Smorodinsky (1975) rule on our domain (that we call the Proportional rule). In that paper, we also analyze the implications of a disagreement payoff monotonicity property.
The literature also contains some other extensions of the Nash model. Gupta and Livne (1988) analyze bargaining problems with an additional reference point (in the feasible set).
They interpret it as a past agreement that the agents can refer to when negotiating. Chun and Thomson (1992) analyze an alternative model where the reference point is not feasible (and is interpreted as a vector of "incompatible" claims). Neither of these two papers, however, focus on disagreement. Livne (1988) and Smorodinsky (2005) analyze cases where the implications of disagreement are uncertain. They thus extend the Nash (1950) model to allow probabilistic disagreement points. Finally, Basu (1996) analyzes cases where disagreement leads to a noncooperative game with multiple equilibria and to model them, he extends the Nash model to allow for a set of disagreement points over which the players do not have probability distributions.
It is interesting to note that in all these extension models, the axiomatic analyses reveal rules that are "decomposable".
Chun and Thomson (1990a and 1990b) and Thomson (1987) .
The common feature of all of the above papers (and the current cooperative bargaining literature for that matter) is that the implications of disagreement are independent of the identity of the agent who causes it. On the other hand, there are noncooperative bargaining models in which agents are allowed to leave and take an outside option. Shaked and Sutton depend on who the last agent to reject an offer was (but the agents are not allowed to leave, disagreement is randomly determined by nature). 5 Our model can be seen as to provide a cooperative counterpart to these noncooperative models.
Model

Preliminaries
Let N = {1, ..., n} be the set of agents. For each i ∈ N, let e i ∈ R N be the vector whose i The set S is s-comprehensive if s-comp{S} ⊆ S.
Let the Euclidean metric be defined as kx − yk = q P (x i − y i ) 2 for x, y ∈ R N and let 5 It is interesting to note that the equilibria of such models use only partial information on the implications of disagreement. For example, an agent's payoff from his opponent leaving has no effect on the equilibrium (except in extreme cases where the problem's individually rational region is empty). Thus, our conjecture is that all these noncooperative bargaining games implement decomposable rules. the Hausdorff metric be defined as
payoff profile that arises from agent i terminating the negotiations.
For each i ∈ N, let d i (D) = max{D ji | j ∈ N} be the maximum payoff agent i can get from disagreement and let d i (D) = min{D ji | j ∈ N} be the minimal payoff. Let
Let Π be the set of all permutations π on N. A function f : R → R is positive affine if there is a ∈ R ++ and b ∈ R such that f (x) = ax + b for each x ∈ R; f is a translation if it is a positive affine function with a = 1. Let Λ be the set of all λ = (λ 1 , ..., λ n ) where each λ i : R → R is a positive affine function. Let Λ trans be the set of all λ = (λ 1 , ..., λ n ) where
For π ∈ Π, S ⊆ R N , and D ∈ R N×N , let π(S) = {y ∈ R N : y = (x π(i) ) i∈N for some x ∈ S} and π(D) = (D π(i)π(j) ) i,j∈N . The set S (respectively, the matrix D) is symmetric if for every
A (nonanonymous-disagreement bargaining) problem for N is a pair (S, D) where
2. S is compact, convex, and d(D)-comprehensive;
Assumptions 1, 2 and a counterpart of 3 are standard in the literature. 6 They essentially come out of problems where the agents have expected utility functions on a bounded set of lotteries.
Let B be the class of all problems for agents in N. 6 When Assumption 3 is violated, the agents are not guaranteed to reach an agreement. Particularly, for each alternative x, there will be an agent who receives higher payoff from someone (including himself) leaving the negotiation table. It will be in the interest of this agent then to follow strategies that induce disagreement rather than to accept x.
Let the metric µ B on B be defined as µ
Given (S, D) ∈ B, the set of Pareto optimal alternatives is P O(S, D) = {x ∈ S | y ≥ x implies y 6 ∈ S}, the set of weakly Pareto optimal alternatives is W P O(S, D) = {x ∈ S | y > x implies y 6 ∈ S}.
Note that for x ∈ S, if there is i ∈ N such that x i < D ii , agent i will rather terminate the negotiations than agree on x. Thus the set of individually rational alternatives is
However, an agent can still prefer an opponent terminating the negotiations to receiving an individually rational agreement. When this is the case, prolonged negotiations, rather than agreement, might be the outcome (unless an agreement deadline can be enforced). We thus define a stronger requirement as follows: the set of alternatives that satisfy the externality (of someone's disagreement) lower bound is
Note that the externality lower bound requires x i = D ii for each agent i and thus implies individual rationality. Also note that Property 3 in the definition of a problem guarantees
For each i ∈ N, the maximal payoff of i with respect to individual rationality is m i (S, D) = max{x i : x ∈ I(S, D)} and the maximal payoff of i with respect to the externality lower bound is
Bargaining Rules
Let F be the class of all rules. Let the metric µ
rule F ∈ F, a feasible set S ⊆ R N , and an agreement x ∈ S, the anonymous inverse set of F at (S, x), which contains all disagreement vectors d that produce x, is defined as
We first introduce some standard properties. A rule F is Pareto optimal if for each
The following is a central property in bargaining theory. It requires the physical bargaining outcome to be invariant under utility-representation changes as long as the under-
weaker version of the property only allows affine transformations with a unit multiplica-
The next property is introduced by Nash (1950) and requires the solution not to change as some "irrelevant" alternatives cease to be feasible. A rule F is contraction independent
A stronger version is introduced by Thomson (1981) : F is strongly contraction indepen-
The following "monotonicity" properties are also standard in the literature. They require that an expansion of the set of possible agreements make no agent worse-off. A rule
The following is a weaker version introduced by Roth (1979) . 9 It has two alternative formulations in our domain. The first is the original one that uses individual rationality: a rule F is restricted monotonic with respect to individual rationality
The second definition is specific to our domain and alternatively uses the externality lower bound: a rule F is restricted monotonic with respect to externality lower bound if
3 Results
Decomposability
Note that the literature on the Nash (1950) model analyzes rules that are defined on problems with anonymous disagreement, φ : B = → R N (hereafter, anonymous-disagreement rules). Two well-known examples are the rules of Nash (1950) and Kalai-Smorodinsky (1975) .
Anonymous-disagreement rules can be extended to our domain via a function that ag-
. This property guarantees (S, α(D)) ∈ B (please see Remark 1) and for there is uncertainty regarding the resulting disagreement vector. 10 Similarly, α E and α M can 10 This, for example, happens when the agents' disagreement payoffs depend on the public opinion (as in the Cyprus case) and due to informational imperfections, it is uncertain who the public will blame for be interpreted as corresponding to cases where there is ambiguity regarding the resulting disagreement vector and where the agents are either optimistic or pessimistic.
The aggregator function α is symmetric if for each symmetric
Let F = be the class of decomposable rules. Let F 6 = = F \ F = be the class of nondecomposable rules.
Decomposable rules extend the solutions of an anonymous-disagreement rule to the whole domain B in a consistent manner. The following are two examples of decomposable rules. For an anonymous-disagreement rule φ, the individually rational extension of φ is defined
The extension of φ that respects the externality lower bound is defined as
The following is a simple but useful observation on decomposable rules (for its proof, please see the Appendix).
12
In this section, we analyze the extent to which the imposition of decomposability restricts the class of admissible rules. Since decomposable rules are intimately linked to the Nash domain, this will give us an idea on how big a class of rules was ruled out by the anonymousdisagreement assumption of Nash.
Consider the following rather technical property. Fix any disagreement matrix, D ∈ R N×N . Then for each feasible set S ⊆ R N , consider the set of anonymous disagreement
(note that the set of such d is the anonymous disagreement. 11 Two other examples are as follows. The extension of φ run from the average is defined as
) and the extension of φ run from the minimum is defined as
. 12 Note that we use the notation F | B = to denote the restriction of F to the subdomain B = .
. We thus have the following lemma (for its proof, please see the Appendix).
Lemma 2 A rule is decomposable if and only if it is disagreement-simple.
Note that disagreement simplicity is a very demanding property. Therefore, bargaining rules on our extended domain are mostly nondecomposable. We next present a result that supports this intuition. We show that the class of decomposable rules F = is nowhere dense in F, that is Int(Cl(F = )) = ∅. The class F = is nowhere dense in F if and only if the interior of its complement, Int(F 6 = ), is dense in F (see Sutherland (2002) , pg. 63-64). 13 This means that the interior of the class of nondecomposable rules, F 6 = (which by definition is an open set) is so big that it can be used to approximate any rule.
Theorem 1
The class of decomposable rules F = is nowhere dense in F.
14 Proof. We first show that any decomposable rule can be approximated by a nondecomposable rule.
Step 1. For each F ∈ F = and ε > 0, there is
Fix some (S * , D * ) ∈ B 6 = and let x * = F (S * , D * ). Without loss of generality assume ε < 1
for some x ∈ S * such that kx * − xk < δ,
Finally, to see that F ε is nondecomposable, note that for x ∈ S * \{x ε } such that kx * − xk < δ,
violates disagreement simplicity and by Lemma 2, is nondecomposable.
We will next show that F ε ∈ Int(F 6 = ).
Step 2. There is γ > 0 such that for all
Combining the two displayed inequalities, we obtain
violates disagreement simplicity and by Lemma 2, is nondecomposable. This establishes that F ε ∈ Int(F 6 = ).
Finally, we will show that any rule at the closure of F = can be approximated by rules from Int(F 6 = ).
Step 3. For each F ∈ F 6 = \Int(F 6 = ) and ε > 0 there is
. Now since F 00 ∈ F = , by steps 1 and 2, there is
. But then, by triangle inequality, µ F (F, F 0 ) < ε proves the claim. Note that the relationship between problems with anonymous disagreement, B = , and problems with nonanonymous disagreement, B 6 = , is quite similar to that between F = and
Remark 2 The class B = is nowhere dense in B.
While decomposable rules constitute a nowhere dense subset of all nonanonymous-disagreement rules, they are very central. In other extensions of the Nash model as well (such as Gupta and Livne (1988), Livne (1988) , Chun and Thomson (1992) , Basu (1996) , and Smorodinsky (2005)), the axiomatic analyses always reveal rules that are decomposable into some "aggregator function" and a "standard rule" from the Nash domain. In what follows, we thus focus on such rules.
We observe that two extensions of a standard property in the literature (see for example, Peters, 1986), both imply decomposability. A rule satisfies independence of non-
The second formulation is specific to our domain: F satisfies independence of alternatives that violate the externality lower bound if for each
Proposition 3 If a rule F is independent of non-individually rational alternatives, then it is the individually rational extension of some anonymous-disagreement rule φ, that is,
If a rule F is independent of alternatives that violate the externality lower bound, then it is the extension of some anonymous-disagreement rule φ that respects the externality lower bound, that is,
Now if F is independent of non-individually rational alternatives, then for each
of alternatives that violate the externality lower bound, then for each
The converse of the statements in Proposition 3 are not true. For example, any composition with an aggregator function of the following anonymous-disagreement rule violates both independence properties: φ(S, d) = arg max x∈S x i .
Note that a weaker formulation of these independence properties that additionally require the disagreement matrix to remain fixed also coincide with the original property of Peters (1986) on B = . 15 These weaker properties are satisfied by a large class of nondecomposable rules. 15 The original property can be stated as follows:
Therefore, the restrictions of the following properties to the Nash domain also coincide with the original property. A bargaining rule satisfies weak independence of nonindividually rational alternatives if for
isfies weak independence of alternatives that violate the externality lower bound if for each
Figure 2: Case 1 in the proof of Theorem 2.
Extensions of the Kalai-Smorodinsky Rule
Kalai and Smorodinsky (1975) introduce the following anonymous-disagreement rule: for
They show that, on the Nash domain, this rule uniquely satisfies weak Pareto optimality, symmetry, scale invariance, and "restricted monotonicity" (also see Roth (1979) and Thomson (1996)). 16, 17 We next show that two similar results prevail among decomposable rules on our domain.
18 16 On anonymous disagreement problems, B = , the two restricted monotonicity properties of our paper coincide with that of Roth (1979) . 17 The results of Kalai and Smorodinsky (1975) and Roth (1979) are for two-agent problems. Thomson (1996) however notes that this statement holds for an arbitrary number of agents. 18 On the other hand, an infinite number of nondecomposable rules satisfy the Kalai-Smorodinsky (1975) properties. The following class of two-agent rules is an example: let ρ, β 1 , β 2 ∈ [0, 1] and for all i ∈ N and
>> .
Theorem 2 The individually rational extension of the Kalai-Smorodinsky rule (κ •
uniquely satisfies weak Pareto optimality, symmetry, scale invariance, restricted monotonicity with respect to individual rationality, and decomposability.
The extension of the Kalai-Smorodinsky rule that satisfies the externality lower bound (κ • α E ) uniquely satisfies weak Pareto optimality, symmetry, scale invariance, restricted monotonicity with respect to the externality lower bound, and decomposability.
Proof. It is straightforward to show that κ • α I and κ • α E satisfy the given properties. For uniqueness, let F = φ•α be a decomposable rule (on B) that satisfies weak Pareto optimality, symmetry, scale invariance, and restricted monotonicity with respect to individual rationality.
Now if F satisfies any one of the properties above, it also satisfies them on B = . By Lemma 1 then, φ satisfies the given properties. Therefore by Kalai-Smorodinsky (1975) , Roth (1979) , and Thomson (1996) , φ = κ.
and assume that ε > 0 is sufficiently small so that P O(S) ⊆ P O(S ε ).
Now note thatm
Thus by the definition of κ,
and for i ∈ N \ {k} Figure 3 : Case 2 in the proof of Theorem 2.
, by restricted monotonicity with respect to indi-
Case 2: (Figure 3 ) 
and assume that ε > 0 is sufficiently small so thatm
and for i ∈ N \ {k}
A similar argument proves the result for the externality lower bound.
The uniqueness result of Theorem 2 turns out to be an exception. An infinite number of decomposable rules survive the Nash (1950), Kalai (1977) , and Thomson (1981) properties even though, on problems with anonymous disagreement each of these results characterizes a single rule. We next characterize the exact classes of decomposable rules that satisfy these properties.
Extensions of the Nash Rule
Nash (1950) introduces the following anonymous-disagreement rule:
He shows that, on the Nash domain, this rule uniquely satisfies weak Pareto optimality, symmetry, scale invariance, and contraction independence. On our domain, these properties characterize the following class of decomposable rules (for the proof, please see the Appendix).
19
Proposition 4 (Corollary to Nash, 1950) A decomposable rule F on B satisfies weak Pareto optimality, symmetry, scale invariance, and contraction independence if and only if 19 There also are infinitely many nondecomposable rules that satisfy the Nash (1950) properties. The following class of two-agent rules is an example: let
F is decomposable into the Nash rule ν and a symmetric and scale invariant aggregator function α; that is, F = ν • α.
On a class of two-agent problems, the aggregator functions characterized in Proposition 4 turn out to have a very particular structure. This class of problems represent cases where the agents disagree on their ranking of the two disagreement alternatives: 
Outside B 2 6 À , symmetry and scale invariance do not have similar implications. Two-agent problems where the agents agree on their strict ranking of the two disagreement alternatives are never symmetric. 20 Thus on this class, symmetry has no bite. Alternatively for problems
>> and define
20 In a private communication, Steve Brams suggested the attack on Pearl Harbor as an example to this case. At the time, both parties preferred Japan's war declaration to that of U.S.. For the U.S. government this would strengthen the domestic support for the war effort. As we now know, the Japanese government preferred the advantage of a preemptive strike. Of course, whether the U.S. government expected such an attack is an interesting issue and raises questions about asymmetric information on the implications of disagreement.
with more than two agents, scale invariance has much weaker implications. 21 Due to Proposition 3, among the decomposable rules characterized in Proposition 4, only two satisfy respective independence properties. That is, the individually rational extension of the Nash rule (ν • α I ) uniquely satisfies weak Pareto optimality, symmetry, scale invariance, contraction independence, and independence of non-individually rational alternatives. Also, the extension of the Nash rule that satisfies the externality lower bound (ν • α E ) uniquely satisfies weak Pareto optimality, symmetry, scale invariance, contraction independence, and independence of alternatives that violate the externality lower bound.
The following property is also satisfied by a unique extension of the Nash rule. A rule F satisfies the externality lower bound if for each (S, D) ∈ B, F (S, D) ∈ E(S, D).
Proposition 6
The extension of the Nash rule that respects the externality lower bound,
is the only extension of the Nash rule that satisfies the externality lower bound.
For the proof of Proposition 6, please see the Appendix. This result is rather surprising since, unlike the externality lower bound, individual rationality is satisfied by a large class of Nash extensions. 22 Only when the two requirements coincide does individual rationality imply a unique extension of the Nash rule. Kalai (1977) introduces the following anonymous-disagreement rule, called the Egalitarian
Extensions of the Egalitarian and Utilitarian Rules
. 21 With two agents, disagreement matrices on B 2 6 À are divided into six equivalence classes: two matrices in the same class are related by a positive affine transformation. In an equivalence class, it is sufficient to fix α(D) for a single D; scale invariance then defines the aggregator function for every other matrix in the same equivalence class. With three or more agents however, the number of equivalence classes becomes infinite.
Thus, the class of aggregator functions that satisfy symmetry and scale invariance becomes much larger and lacks a similar structure. 22 A rule F satisfies individual rationality if for each (S, D) ∈ B, F (S, D) ∈ I(S, D).
He shows that, on the Nash domain, this rule uniquely satisfies weak Pareto optimality, symmetry, and strong monotonicity. On our domain, these properties characterize the following class of decomposable rules (for the proof, please see the Appendix).
Proposition 7 (Corollary to Kalai, 1977) A decomposable rule F on B satisfies weak Pareto optimality, symmetry, and strong monotonicity if and only if there is a symmetric aggregator function α such that F = γ • α.
Among nondecomposable rules, a large class of monotone path rules satisfy the properties of Proposition 7. For more on this issue, please see Kıbrıs and Tapkı (2006) . Thomson (1981) discusses the following anonymous-disagreement rule:
He shows that, on the subset B sc = of the Nash domain, this rule uniquely satisfies Pareto optimality, symmetry, translation invariance, and strong contraction independence. On our domain, these properties characterize the following class of decomposable rules (for the proof, please see the Appendix). Thomson, 1981 ) On B sc = , a rule F satisfies Pareto optimality, symmetry, translation invariance, strong contraction independence, and decomposability if and only if there is an aggregator function α such that F = τ • α.
Proposition 8 (Corollary to
We also observe that, a decomposable rule satisfies the Perles-Maschler (1981) properties in our domain if and only if it is an extension of the Perles-Maschler rule where α is symmetric and scale invariant.
Implications of Sensitivity Properties
In this subsection, we focus on the relationship between the properties satisfied by a decomposable rule F = φ • α, and its components. Since φ = F | B = , any property satisfied by F passes on to φ. This, however, is not the case with the aggregator function α. We next provide an analysis for the aggregator function.
We focus on scale invariance and symmetry. Other properties of F , such as Pareto optimality, contraction independence, and "monotonicity" are not related to changes in the disagreement point and thus do not have implications on the aggregator function α.
Scale invariance.
If an anonymous-disagreement rule φ and an aggregator function α are both scale invariant, their composition F = φ • α also satisfies the property. However, not all scale invariant F are created this way. As demonstrated next, composition of a scale invariant φ with a non-scale invariant α might also create a scale invariant F .
Then define φ and α as follows:
If, however, an anonymous-disagreement rule φ is sufficiently "sensitive" to changes in the disagreement point, its only scale invariant extensions are those that are obtained by compositions with scale invariant aggregator functions α. More surprisingly, the converse implication also holds. More formally, an anonymous-disagreement rule φ is disagreement
and φ(S, d) 6 = φ(S, d 0 ). 23 Note that both the Nash (1950) and the Kalai-Smorodinsky (1975) rules satisfy this property. For such rules, we have the following result. 23 A similar (logically stronger) property can be imposed on nonanonymous-disagreement rules: F is
However, there is no decomposable rule F = φ • α that satisfies strong disagreement sensitivity. To see this, suppose for a contradiction that F is strongly disagreement sensi-
Theorem 3 An anonymous-disagreement rule φ is disagreement sensitive if and only if for any scale invariant and decomposable rule F = φ • α, the aggregator function α is also scale invariant.
Proof. First, let φ be disagreement sensitive and let α be any aggregator function. Assume
Since φ is disagreement sensitive, there is S ⊆ R N such that φ(S, λ(α(D))) 6 = φ(S, α(λ(D))).
Since φ is scale invariant
For the opposite direction, suppose φ is scale invariant but not disagreement sensitive. We want to show that there is an aggregator function α that is not scale invariant, but
Then, define α : R N×N → R N as follows:
Note that for any λ ∈ Λ other than the identity function,
If λ is the identity function, the statement trivially holds. Thus, suppose λ is different than the identity function.
Since, φ and d(.) are both scale invariant,
Symmetry.
If an anonymous-disagreement rule φ and an aggregator function α are both symmetric, their composition F = φ • α also satisfies the property. However, not all symmetric F are created this way. As demonstrated next, composition of a symmetric φ with a non-symmetric α might also create a symmetric F , even when φ satisfies disagreement sensitivity.
Example 2 (A symmetric F = φ • α where α is not symmetric, even though φ is disagreement sensitive) Let N = {1, 2}. Let D * ∈ R N×N be a symmetric matrix and let S * ⊆ R N be a symmetric set such that (S * , D * ) ∈ B 6 = . Reminding the reader that γ stands for the Egalitarian rule of Kalai (1977) , we define φ and α as follows:
Note that since (S * , D * ) ∈ B 6 = , the vector D * 1 is not symmetric.
otherwise.
If, however, an anonymous-disagreement rule φ is sufficiently "sensitive to asymmetry", its only symmetric extensions are those that are obtained by compositions with symmetric aggregator functions α. As was previously, the converse of this statement is also true.
More formally, an anonymous-disagreement rule φ is sensitive to asymmetry if for each asymmetric d ∈ R N and for each ε ∈ R ++ , there is a symmetric S ⊆ R N such that (i)
) is asymmetric. Note that symmetric anonymous-disagreement rules such as the Nash (1950), Kalai-Smorodinsky (1975) , or the Egalitarian (Kalai, 1977) rules all satisfy this property. On the other hand, the Utilitarian rule (Thomson, 1981) does not. For such rules, we have the following result.
Theorem 4 An anonymous-disagreement rule φ is sensitive to asymmetry if and only if for any symmetric and decomposable rule F = φ•α, the aggregator function α is also symmetric.
Proof. First, let φ be sensitive to asymmetry and let α be any aggregator function. Assume
Let ε ∈ R ++ be such that D ∈ N ε (α(D)). Then by sensitivity to asymmetry, there is a
For the opposite direction, suppose φ is symmetric but not sensitive to asymmetry. We want to show that there is an asymmetric aggregator function α such that F = φ • α is symmetric. Since φ is not sensitive to asymmetry, there is an asymmetric d * ∈ R N and an
Define α : R N×N → R N as follows:
is disagreement-simple.
Define the aggregator function α : 
Proof. (Proposition 4)
It is straightforward to show that ν•α satisfies the given properties.
For uniqueness, let F = φ • α be a decomposable rule on B. Now if F satisfies any one of the properties above, it also satisfies them on B = . By Lemma 1 then, φ satisfies the given properties. Therefore by Nash (1950), φ = ν.
Next we show that the symmetry of F implies the symmetry of α (see Figure 4 , left).
We finally show that the scale invariance of F implies the scale invariance of α (see Figure 4 , right). Since F is scale invariant, for each (S, D) ∈ B and λ ∈ ∧, we have , D) ). Also, by decomposability of F and scale invariance of ν, Also, the level curve for the Nash objective function at x, Q x i , has the normal vector n = (
, ...,
) at x. Since there is z ∈ E and γ > 0 such that n = γz, we have ν(S, 0) = x. 
